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Education, Evaluation, and the Metrics of Learning*
Barbara Heyns
University of California at Berkeley

The most common critique of recent large-scale
cross-sectional research is that the survey design is
not longitudinal, and that the critical dependent
vari able, relative achievement level, is not an accurate assessment of learning. Studies which have included longitudinal test data, however, have rarely
demonstrated significant effects; such studies are
then criticized because they involve ex post facto desi gns wi th poorly matched control groups and analysis
of covariance adjustment techniques (Lord , 1967; Lord,
1969; Campbell and Erl ebacher , 19 70; Cronbach and
Furby, 19 70; Rossi and Williams, 19 72). Randomization
is f requently an impossibility in quasi-experimental
research designs, and as Lord has argued, " . . . there
is no logical or statistical procedure . . . which
. makes proper allowances for uncontrolled preexisting differences between groups" (Lord, 1967, p. 305).
The present paper is oriented toward a more fundamental critique of the use of test scores in a longitudinal analysis, and a partial explanation of the inability to demonstrate significant differential learning in either natural or experimental settings. I
shall argue that what is needed to evaluate the impact
of programs on the academic performance of children is
an empirically verified measure of learning, rather
than changes in relative position on standardi zed
tests. At the outset, I will discuss common concepts
of test theory and measurement, and provide examples
*Paper prepared for the American Sociological Association meetings, Montreal, 1974.
Professor Heyns is on the faculty of the University of
California at Berkeley. Research support for this
paper is from the Office of Economic Opportunity,
Grant No. 10301. Permission to cite or quote should
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of how differences in metric change the interpretations of research findings. The purpose is twofold:
to clarify the assumptions in using existing test metrics, and to suggest ways of constructing more valid
indicators of change.

.-

The psychometric appr1oach to measuring differential ability or achievement is often cited as "the
most important technical contribution psychology has
made to the guidance of human affairs" (Cronbach,
1970, p. 197). In broad outline, the methods and assumptions employed are similar to a variety of forms
of personality assessment prevalent in psychology.
The model is adopted directly from the physical sciences, and textbooks abound with analogies between
measuring heat and measuring intelligence. The model
essentially construes ability (or achievement, anxiety
or self-esteem) as a trait, or a construct which is
present by degree in individuals. An adage of· the
psychometrician is that if a thing exists, it exists
in certain amounts, and therefore can be measured.
The construct is assumed to inhere in individuals, as
an innate trait, behavioral predisposition, or as a
fluid property. Constructs are related to behavior
through "semantic" (Lord and Novick, 1968) or "epistemic" definitions (Torgerson, 1958), which form the
rules of correspondence between theoretical constructs
and the domain of observable behavior. A variable is
considered an indicator of the construct if the expected value varies systematically with respect to the
construct. A variable is considered a measure if, and
only if, the expected value of the indicator increases
monotonically with respect to the construct. Achievement test scores are therefore valid measures of the
latent, unobserved construct achievement, if they are
isomorphic and increase monotonically with respect to
the construct.
Viewed in this manner, the problem of measurement
is selecting the set of items which provide a mapping
from test scores to the construct achievement. This
generally reduces to defining the set of items which
best differentiate between 1persons with more or less
of the postulated construct. Achievement test items

4
are selected which best discriminate between high and
low scoring pupils, for example. Such a process is
justified as a means of refining the measure, although
it also has the effect of selecting the subtest of
items most highly related to each other. Achievement
tests are not generally scrutinized as closely nor
scaled as adequately as were initial tests of intelligence; in fact, most achievement tests are routinely
compared to I.Q. tests in order to validate the postulated ordinal relationships and in order to impute an
interval scale and a known distribution. The degree
to which a construct exists or is meaningful is not
questioned if the resulting measure can be shown to be
predictive of differential performance. The problem
of defining a mapping function which relates the measure to the construct is common to all tests of cognitive ability. It has led to assertions such as that
of Edwin Boring, that "intelligence is what intelligence tests measure." The parallel assertion would be
equally valid, although perhaps less satisfying, that
reading is what tests of reading comprehension measure.

The levels of measurement involved in test construction are important for an understanding of the
logic of establishing numerical relationships and assessing rates of growth. A level of measurement is
distinguished by the relative complexity of the mathematical system with which it is associated; levels admit certain kinds of transformations and operations
which may be performed meaningfully within the system
(cf. Guilford, 1954; Torgerson, 1958; Kerlinger, 1964;
Lord and Novick, 1968; Krantz, Luce, and Supps, 1971).
Nominal measurement is used only for purposes of classifying objects into mutually exclusive subsets. In
order to do so, one must be able to apply the identity
and equality functions:
(a= b) or (a~ b), but not both
[ (a = b) and (b = c)], then (a = c)

[Eq. 1]
[Eq. 2]

A nominal category is not strictly measurement, since
a numerical label can be attached only for the purpose
of classification, without any assumptions of order
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or magnitude.
The second or ordinal level of measurement presupposes nominal properties, and in addition requires
. .
ht th e t rans1v1ty
ta
postu l i te:
I

If [(a > b) and (b>c)], then (a > c).

[Eq. 3]

The capacity to order subsets meaningfully is thus permitted, and any scale which yields the same relative
order is an admissable transfonnation.
The level of measurement most conunonly assumed in
achievement tests requires interval measurement. An
interval scale specifies a ]direct mapping between behavioral elements and the ~eal numbers; the zero point
cannot be set and the metric or interval length is
arbitrary. Interval scales can be subjected to any
linear transformation, such as addition or subtraction.
We may say for example that the difference between students scoring six and eight is equal to the difference
between students scoring two and four; however, we cannot assert that the achievement of students scoring
eight is twice as great as those scoring four.
A fourth level, that df ratio measurement, allows
for multiplicative relatioriships, since the existence
of a zero point is fixed. A ratio scale permits one
to argue that one unit has half as much or three times
more than the amount of achievement as another. Ratio
measurement is never claimed for achievement tests, although the literature abounds with conclusions which,
strictly speaking, require it.
Ordinal measurement is a necessity for assessing
differential ability or acHievement. The assumption
is made that ability is c~ulative, and that it is possible to select a subset o.i items which can be ordered
in such a manner that a correct response on the n+1st
item presupposes correct responses on then preceding
items. Such a relationship is basic for asserting
ordinal properties to a measure and for the construction of scales. Interval measurement is imputed arbitrarily to tests of ability, based on pragmatic
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considerations. The most frequent rationale is distributional, and most tests are scaled to yield a normal distribution. Abelson and Tukey (1959) have suggested choosing scales so as to provide additivity of
effects; however, most testing specifies a convenient
distributional form which allows interval properties
based on a normal curve. The distribution is justified by the central-limit theorem and by the empirical
fit of measures. A substantial amount of work has
been done in ~caling items for intelligence tests and
generating a subset of items which would resemble a
Gutman scale, and also would be predictive of school
achievement, defined by teacher's ratings or student
performance on related criteria . For most achievement
batteries, comparable work has not been done; instead,
a substantial and linear relationship with intellectual capacity defined by I.Q. tests is taken as a sufficient rationale for imputing interval properties.
For any particular ability test, the assumptions
present do not seem particularly onerous, although one
might wish the constraints imposed were given more
than passing mention. The difficulty in an analysis
of data in which one is concerned with differential
learning, not just relative position at one point in
time, however, is large.
In order to assert that a gain based on a particular metric is isomorphic to learning, one must assume
that learning is a monotonically increasing function
described by changes in test score data, based on a
particular metric. For achievement tests, the most
conunonly used metrics are raw scores, standardized raw
scores, or grade equivalent scores. The measures are
not typically linear transformations of each other and
yield quite different learning profiles for students
at different positions on the scale. For example, if
student A scores 50 and student B scores 40 on a 60item achievement pretest, the question of whether A's
achievement is higher than B's is one of the validity
and reliability of the test. Classical test theory
defines an ordering in tenns of true scores, and imputes a metric assuming a normal distribution of the
construct achievement. Imagine, however, that
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students A and B scored 55 and 50 respectively on a
parallel fonn posttest. How would one detennine which
student learned the most? The interval [50, 55] is
less than the interval [40, 50]; on a test in which
all items were equally di~ficult, the intuitive response that student B hadi learned the most would be
correct. However, transforming scores to standardized
values, normed on a national sample, the gains appear
equal, at about 1.4" standard deviations. In grade
equivalent units, student A gained 1.3 years, while
student B gained only .8 of a year. Such disparities
are not unusual in comparing achievement metrics. The
transformations which are typically used to evaluate
growth fundamentally depend on assumptions about the
metrics of achievement. Particularly for Sociologists,
who are often interested in comparing the relative
growth of students from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, interpretations of relative growth depend on
the metrics of learning and the position on the scale
originally.
A more precise examp l e of the difficulties inherent in comparing test results and inferring learning
is given in Table 1. The data is based on the Metropolitan Achievement Test, Word Knowledge, with gains
computed as the difference between a fall 1971 pretest
and a spring 1972 posttest on a parallel form of the
intennediate battery. The sample is a group of white
sixth grade students in Atlanta, presented by levels
of mother's education. R~w scores reflect the absolute number of correct responses on the test of student vocabulary. The average white student in Atlanta
gained five and one-half words during the sixth grade;
however, the gains were inversely related to mother's
education. Grade equivalent gains yield precisely the
opposite conclusion with tespect to background, while
either standardized metrit yields quite ambiguous results.
1

The explanation of the observed pattern does not
depend on threshold effecfs, or on non-linearity between a pretest and posttest. It depends on the data
transfonnations involved in changing metrics. Raw
scores are not linearly related to either normalized
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF GAIN SCORES BY METRIC, METROPOLITAN
ACHIEVEMENT TEST, WORD KNOWLEDGE FOR WHITE SIXTH
GRADE STUDENTS IN ATLANTA, BY MOTHER'S EDUCATION,
FALL 1971 - SPRING 1972

Raw
Score

Standard
Scorel

Grade
Equivvalent 1

5.5

4.0

. 85

.28

0-11 years

6.6

4.0

.53

.55

12 years

6.3

4.0

1. 02

.81

13+ years

5.0

4.1

1.19

-1. 04

Mother's
Education
White

Standardized
Scores,
Atlanta Only2

1Published norms, based on national sample.
2standardized raw scores, for Atlanta population.
The total gain is not equal to O because non-white
students were included in the sample. Scores were
normalized prior to standardization.
standard scores or to grade equivalents, although they
are used to create both . Raw scores plotted against
normalized standard scores on the Metropolitan Achievement Tests yields an S-shaped distribution, largely because the actual scores are slightly more peaked than
a normal distribution. For consecutive batteries,
standardized scores are quite erratic and lead one to
conclude that gains are not linear across grades.
Grade equivalent gain scores are computed by
interpolating raw scores between pupils of different
ages, and imputing a score based on the average attained at a particular grade level. Such scores are
relatively crude, have quite large standard errors,
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and are not advisable for assessing a particular individual's position. For the purpose of evaluation, however, they embody a metric which is at least tied to
the actual expected scores of pupils over time. Grade
equivalents are not linearly related to either raw
scores or standard scores, but give greater increments
of gain as one increases in actual raw score. This
implies that the gains are larger per raw score point
for scores above the median, while the lower half of
the distribution requires a greater actual improvement
in numbers of questions correct to product an equivalent gain. For this reason, one finds in large crosssectional surveys that the gap between white and black
students in standardized scores can remain constant,
at one standard deviation, while the gap in grade
equivalence increases consistently (Coleman and
Karweit, 1970).
In terms of learning, the various metrics incorporate different analytic assumptions. To utilize raw
scores, one must assume the test items are scaled to
produce equal intervals, which is tantamount to assuming items are equally difficult between and within
forms. This is clearly not the case. Standardized
scores transform all raw scores to a common distributional form based on a normal distribution. Standardized scores ignore any learning which does not alter
the relative position of students, by equalizing the
variances across time. Standardized scores are enormously influenced by the norming population and, as
Table 1 demonstrates, yield quite different results
when comparing subgroups to the nation.
Both standardized scores and grade equivalents
embody the critical assumption that the total number
of items correct is an ordinal scale that unambiguously
orders individuals by relative achievement. All transformations of raw scores are designed to impute interval measurement; although this is a worthwile endeavor,
it would make considerably more sense to examine the
items and to determine whether students at some particular relative position br grade level position could
correctly respond to the particular item, and then to
weight the respective items by· relative difficulty
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defined by the probability of a correct response.
Such procedures would not assume that the total score
is designed to order students according to some trait,
nor necessarily assume that achievement is a construct.
The construct paradigm has become so much a part
of the general theoretical orientation in education
that it is difficult to imagine an alternative approach. For the sake of comparison, one might conceive of intelligence or achievement as a set of cognitive and behavioral skills. Rather t han being an
entity possessed in varying amounts, the skills would
be divisible in a variety of ways. The position of
individuals would be defined by the proportion of
total skills known, and in relation to some universe
of knowledge, not merely in relation to a set of peers.
With such a notion of achievement, a sampling paradigm
would be a much more fruitful perspective for developing measures of differential performance. Considerably more attention would be paid to how representative
particular items were of the universe of skills a person had at his command, rather than just relative
position. For example, if one wished to assess the
vocabulary skills of a sixth grade child, it would be
useful to know how closely correct responses reflected
total words known . A finite universe of words exists
which could be categorized by relative difficulty, for
example. Items would be randomly selected to be representative of the categories, and correct responses
weighted by the sampling probabilities. The major advantage of such a procedure would be that a test could
be assumed to measure the size of total vocabulary,
and the rates of learning could be assessed. Logical
research questions to be posed would be how best to
categorize the skills in question, and how to order
subsets by complexity, difficulty, or relevance.
Learning in this context would be measured as an increase in the proportion of skills the person could
command, rather than just shifts in relative position.
The metric underlying differential performance could
be related to the absolute level of information or
skills, with errors due to sampling. In practice, the
weighted scheme employed might be no more complex than
the present indices computed to determine the relative
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difficulty of items. The advantage, however, would be
a considerably less ambiguous metric for determining
cognitive development. At present, the only conceptual paradigm which is available cannot be used to
determine how much learning occurs, or what a differential rate of leaI11ing would be, without implausible
assumptions. Such issues are crucial for the analysis
of longitudinal data, irrespective of the study design.
In an effort to demonstrate the measurement variability introduced by assuming items are equally difficult, the items on the Metropolitan Achievement Test,
Word Knowledge, administered in Atlanta in the fall of
1972 were analyzed. Each item was weighted by the proportion of students correctly responding to the question, and the resulting scdres standardized. Table 2
presents the mean scores from the standardized raw
scores and the standardized weighted raw scores, for
Atlanta students, by particular number of correct responses. As is evident from the table, the variances
in standardized weighted sdores is quite considerable,
and related to the position of students. This implies
that a similar raw score could lead to very different
actual positions when relative difficulty is controlled. The cluster of items which a student correctly answers could be mo~e or less difficult than
the raw score would indicate, and the error introduced
could be as much as five or ten actual correct items.
The degree of variability is as large as the average
increment during one year of schooling, the increment
which we typically call leaI11ing. Since both the
weighted and unweighted scdres would have the same
reliability, the variance introduced is due to differential difficulty rather than to error. Quite obviously, one would want to extend the item analysis to
see the degree to which di£ficulty influences estimates
of learning; however, the necessary pretest scores by
items was not available.
Although the present analysis has largely focused
on practical difficulties, the theoretical issues are
of no mean importance. Ps~chometricians have expressed
concel1l with the long-standing division between leal1ling theory and classical test theory (Atkinson and
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF METROPOLITAN ACHIEVEMENT TEST
STANDARDIZED SCORES AND SCORES WEIGHTED BY
DIFFICULTY, ATLANTA 1972

Raw
Scores

Mean
Standardized
Score

Weighted Standardized Score
Mean
Variance

25

44

43.2

7.1

30

50

51.1

8.2

35

54

57.3

9.3

40

59

68.2

10.1

45

66

74.3

12.8

50

80

88.1

16.7

Paulson, 1971; Cotton and Harris, 1973). Achievement
scores are generally considered less heritable than
intelligence tests (Jensen, 1967), although this may
reflect merely greater Wlreliability. The notions
implicit in classical test theory lead one to attribute much change in relative position to W1reliability;
efforts to separate stability and W1reliability have
been made, although they assume either a constant
variance or constant reliabilities over time (Heise,
1971; Wiley and Wiley, 1972; Armor, 1973). The general problem leads to what Bereiter has called the Hunreliability-invalidity dilemma"; that is, the more reliable a particular measure, the higher is the testretest correlation, and the less it varies under any
experimental conditions. The lower the reliability,
the greater the probability that the test is not measuring the same thing, and therefore the validity is
low. Classical test theory assumes reliability is a
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property of the instrument, and is random with respect
to particular individuals; yet it can easily be demonstrated that reliabilities, whether KR-20 as a measure
of internal consistency or test-retest correlations,
differ for different socioeconomic groups.
The argument offered herein is that we have at
present no clear conceptual or empirical tools which
lead to unambiguous assessments of learning. Changes
in raw scores are not an ordinal scale of learning,
unless one wishes to assume that different groups
learn at different rates depending on the metric used.
Available tests invite highly consistent results for
evaluation, and that is that no changes in relative
position occur which cannot be attributed to unreliability. What is needed is a more precise, empirically verified theory of learning with which to evaluate the progress of children.
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